Android App Fraud – Haken Clicker and Joker Premium Dialer

February 21, 2020
Research by: Ohad Mana, Israel Wernik, Bogdan Melnykov, Aviran Hazum


Check Point researchers have recently discovered a new clicker malware family, along with fresh samples of the Joker malware family in Google Play.
Throughout this publication we present a brief overview of the malicious campaigns, and describe the technical analysis that has been performed around the two families of malware.


‘Haken’ & ‘BearClod’ Clickers:

  • Overview:

Clickers, malware that mimics the user and perform ‘clicks’ on ads, are a rising threat in the mobile industry. Recently, UpsteamSystems published a report regarding a clicker dubbed ‘ai.type’ or ‘BearClod’. We have observed an increase in activity and scale of the operation behind this clicker, with 47 new applications that were available on Google Play, and were downloaded more than 78 million times by users.

While monitoring the increased activity of ‘BearClod’, we were able to find another clicker family: ‘Haken’. This campaign has just begun its path in Google Play. With 8 malicious applications, and over 50,000 downloads, the clicker aims to get a hold of as many devices as possible to generate illegitimate profit.


Figure 1 – Haken Clicker Application on Google Play

Figure 2 – Haken Clicker Details from Google Play

Figure 3 – Google Play reviews and comments for Haken Clicker
  • Capabilities:

Both ‘BearCloud’ and ‘Haken’ clicker families use different approaches for the implementation of the clicking functionality. While the ‘BearClod’ utilizes a web-view creation and loading of malicious JavaScript code that performs the clicking, the Haken clicker utilizes native code and injection to Facebook and AdMob libraries while communicating with a remote server to get the configuration.

The first entry point of the Haken clicker is the receiver called ‘BaseReceiver’. This receiver asks for permissions that the backdoored app (in this case, a compass application that actually provides a compass service) does not require to function, for instance,BOOT_COMPLETED which let the backdoored application to run code at device start-up.

Figure 4 – Haken Clicker Permissions

This BaseReceiver loads a native library ‘kagu-lib’ and calls from it a method called ‘startTicks’, which after inspection calls the method ‘clm’ from ‘com/google/android/gms/internal/JHandler’. This class registers two workers and a timer. One worker communicates with the C&C server to download a new configuration and process it, while the other is triggered by the timer, checks for requirements and injects code into the Ad-related Activity classes of well-known Ad-SDK’s like Google’s AdMob and Facebook.

Figure 5 – startTicks function

Figure 6 – Communication with C&C to get configuration

Figure 7 – Processing the configuration


Figure 8 – Injection into Facebook and Google

The clicking functionality is implemented in the code that was injected into the Ad-SDK’s ‘onCreate’ function, in this case, it’s the ‘yzt.sta’ method.

                                                    Figure 9 – Calling the injected code    

While using ‘MotionEvent’ to mimic user clicks, those functions are called via reflection.

Figure 10 – Clicking on ads received from the Ad-SDK via reflection on MotionEvent’s obtain.

After reporting this threat to Google, all of the affected applications were removed from Google Play, and most of them have already published a new version without the threat.


  • Summary:

With the usage of native-code, code injection into Ad-SDKs, and backdoored applications from the official store, Haken has shown clicking capabilities while staying under the radar of Google Play. Even with a relatively low download count of 50,000+, this campaign has shown the ability that malicious actors have to generate revenue from fraudulent advertising campaigns.


‘Joker’ Spyware and Premium Dialer:

  • Overview:
    The ‘Joker’ malware family, originally discovered in September 2019, is a spyware and premium dialer (subscribes the user to premium services) for Android that was found on Google Play.
    In the past few months, Joker keeps reappearing in the Google Play store, a few samples at a time. Tatyana Shishkova (@sh1shk0va), recently posted on twitter a few examples of the Joker malware family reaching Google Play:

We have recently discovered four additional samples of Joker on Google Play, downloaded 130,000+ times



Figure 1 – Joker samples





  • Technical Analysis

Strings Encryption:
Joker tries to hide its functionality by modifying the used strings, in this case, Joker utilized a simple XOR cipher with a static key.

Figure 2 – XOR’ed strings and decryption function


Inside the MainActivity’s ‘OnCreate’, the malicious applicationtriggers the malicious process, which then registers a receiver that is used to enable the ‘NotificationListenerService’ service. When a command is received from the loaded module, it then proceeds to run the handler.

Figure 3 – Registration of a receiver

Figure 4 – Notification Listener usage

The handler checks for already downloaded payload, and if present invokes the ‘mas’ method from the payload while using ‘Reflection’, and starts the ‘DirectorAct’ activity.

Figure 5 – Invoke of ‘mas’ function and calling ‘DirectorAct’

DirectorAct’ class invokes another method from the payload, ‘chris’. If any exception was raised while processing or the payload was not downloaded already, Joker contacts the C&C to download a new payload.

Figure 6 – Contacting C&C


Let’s take a look inside the ‘mas’ function called from the main activity.
Upon start, the payload reads the operator information from the device and makes sure that the device is not from the US (MMC 310) or Canada (MMC 302).

Figure 7 – Filtering US and Canada

Once all conditions are met, Joker contacts the payload’s C&C server, from which it loads a configuration.

Figure 8 – Loading configuration

The configuration contains a new URL, for another payload to be loaded, and a class name with a method to be executed after downloading.

Figure 9 – handle configuration

Figure 10 – Dex loading

Figure 11 – Payload execution

With access to the notification listener, and the ability to send SMS, the payload listens for incoming SMS and extract the premium service confirmation code (2FA) and sends it to the “Offer Page”, to subscribe the user to that premium service.
But how does the malware subscribe the user to those services in the first place, you might ask. Inside the configuration received from the C&C server, a list of URLs to contact (“Offer pages”) is processed and opened in a hidden webview.

Figure 12 – Opening a hidden webview and contacting the Offer Page

After reporting those applications, Google has removed them from Google Play.

  • Summary:

While avoiding the US and Canada, this Joker campaign proves the quick turn-around of experienced malicious actors. Almost every week since its launch, Joker managed to get into the official store and get downloaded into users’ devices.

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Appendix 1 – Haken Clicker IOC’s:

Package Name Installs Sha256 10,000+ 381620b5fc7c3a2d73e0135c6b4ebd91e117882f804a4794f3a583b3b0c19bc5
com.haken.compass 10,000+ 30bf493c79824a255f9b56db74a04e711a59257802f215187faffae9c6c2f8dc
com.haken.qrcode 5,000+ 62d192ff53a851855ac349ee9e6b71c1dee8fb6ed00502ff3bf00b3d367f9f38 5,000+ f4da643b2b9a310fdc1cc7a3cbaee83e106a0d654119fddc608a4b587c5552a3 5,000+ a4295a2120fc6b75b6a86a55e8c6b380f0dfede3b9824fe5323e139d3bee6f5c 100+ e811f04491b9a7859602f8fad9165d1df7127696cc03418ffb5c8ca0914c64da 50+ d3f13dd1d35c604f26fecf7cb8b871a28aa8dab343c2488d748a35b0fa28349a
com.vimotech.inongdan 50+ a47049094051135631aea2c9954a6bc7e605ff455cd7ef1e0999042b068a841f


  • C&C Servers:
    • 13[.]250.34.16
    • 13[.]56.233.20
    • 52[.]77.249.152

Appendix 2 – BearClod Clicker IOC’s:


Package Name Installs Sha256 10,000,000+ fa93a5998390bc23949ba86e044e72f8ae20829dd220289b375bfaa76f86bd9a
com.playermusic.musicplayerapp 10,000,000+ a26ce61f3137307ab3456d6312d823bec7a3924d830d8764778803ad48843467
com.musicplayer.playermusic 10,000,000+ 230f66be98f30155934379022cc8656e25917c4fd5c08a36903539ce1bd36f4c
com.mobilityflow.torrent 10,000,000+ 7f8f37be97121bc998999eb947b429d46aeba86abce1ac9d4e4ae0c805a5a8e7
com.riatech.cookbook 5,000,000+ 0cc83c60414bb77a4e18a90b8bbc1d9f7d9e620cad00ba08a3ad7422b179cf16
com.jaredco.regrann 5,000,000+ d3dbff98cc8613aa8403bce35b02640d54744f3606d2f7fe5a461d19cc53ecab 5,000,000+ 3217b65698c7c0df08aea5c9e6d56e4634b1cf10ff48352b45719a596ff53cde
com.galaxyapps.routefinder 5,000,000+ 388b9c2c694a24fd686a615be046e33b94134c362b1432eadb5a50f42a758d8e
qrcode.scanner.qrmaker 5,000,000+ 63a93a1bdb58365363e4c709f811f45cef8dde176cc36a5c2eae7d82c940917c
com.qiblafinder.prayertime.hijricalendar 1,000,000+ 0b186e5044d640a206379c10a272e8d9b07e0bf0a478e6fc0a017c57e8f4e658
com.the7art.keraladreamwallpaper 1,000,000+ 3cc2feb6f8e0eba6d1b0807e1147456e13c109138f1bc346477dee2f0479cc7d
com.videocutter.mp3converter 1,000,000+ 6c39b4ba6140bd0400ebcfb08cdee32203cdffadab7e46452fe2d5bc3d8db86f
com.digitalhud.speedometer 1,000,000+ 84e3341a4d3c603e7cf3e5b91780a942b997779c1468af820b79a57753a3d5a3
com.riatech.salads 1,000,000+ cb8864a684fa4d6886d7f0d22297ca898211aaf8e1c60bab83a1ced69d7e0894
com.elsayad.footballfixtures 1,000,000+ 6d029ddd73111fca8bf8caa88ad81c91d3e75968eb70916d25905f6a8d686d2a 1,000,000+ 29353df1956feb64ba42583f734b84996c4b5a507d1192ef415a930b5c6fed02
com.powerups.pullups 500,000+ 0136e998df49df642c2df7a5ba0da9987e341b6554fa578e935fa15bdf31199f
com.speedgauge.tachometer.speedometer 500,000+ 9472a366c61a89815c03835389a0a9cb823a9fa332262fc297cfe831b380091c
com.elsayad.spider 500,000+ 8d5f1b8d25ba0c297d8c76f40b48032659cb21c1e02e13e98202bc0bdfea0e6a
com.qrscanner.barcodereader 500,000+ 4a74210e9e716092161037fb154c321e29ed454572bf1523a15903ec6eaaf640
com.riatech.souprecipes 500,000+ 17289264e413d46f873295f22b689d7d44e1d3d11b51f39dab34ddccf50fdda2
com.qiblacompass.finder 500,000+ 0ce29f5b76b3efca487f81c55f5bb949a4193d1bc6d5cc9d10ebe8552d8230d0
com.studyapps.mathen 500,000+ 5352c8ee2851bd9d741dce065f37c1eaedfe0c8bc042ff6fda7f0e5388767e06
com.quranmp3ramadan.readquran 500,000+ 53bb04ce6a8d5ae716b30da894760b35f5ce99aab6bcd75081f0e4ac3cd68c49
com.riatech.cakerecipes 500,000+ edf5736c854d81bb950736b6ab746123d3c207ddf57052ef41e6a9a60ed1f4c2
com.powerups.jump 100,000+ e09396e0b17a026c9f87cc0481218d386fe7209f858bf448506f59689154d2f7 100,000+ 73ce0379bae41351b9dcc74c982f5c53b86ea4e656f2190699cc1a1fcf813a1e
com.newsinlevels 100,000+ d34582afde8da306f12b6da21aa4572d2febce656b4dc12a2d662284fc8623b9
com.riatech.diabeticrecipes 100,000+ e71c1dd9984fecf7bc9ba6d70e83dcb42405048bf51e981b896d110eea3fa441
com.muslimduas.islamicdua 100,000+ c816e434a425122522d2be72c750a8c7b3b131e30ed81999331173693ecc95e5
com.riatech.ricerecipes 100,000+ 8c49c79479e642fe424c977566f151828650b4d06d6903fbfa381d957e48ce9f 100,000+ 091bacf055050efe52295e4fb79f27a7929ebfd516d7ae999e13f68ecbb8a255
com.riatech.fitberry 100,000+ 5a8b7403d8857618e4bc06b87a6a91efc11d31debba36b1cfcd53fa55974e7e4
com.qibla.compass.prayertimes 100,000+ 752d32fe5992b7d925d5d87b9066129b052eb8ea360a912c4738c32e6bdae527
com.powerups.pushups 100,000+ efa4dcdb3daca6b560c4523ff4010b9bea26fefb9cc8745312073c0dc503fd2f
com.powerups.plank 100,000+ cf8ac05022a6d51e4da3c91dd512e4355ebee877de37a1dfe01b2275f97da551
com.shikh.gurbaniradio.livekirtan 100,000+ a646aade6787965b3fc71dd3e73b9a15ec65eedcadc8f14cba188425f4079040
com.ramadan.appsourcehub 100,000+ bce72d9a3c61965522688d6b5f28884f1210dc3ccc22439982257391e6fc36a8 100,000+ 8c35b156a84cb5e962d218b9ee98ed206f7ee814ba0cec784c1ce9dfc6d81e61
com.powerups.squats 100,000+ c5ffc91bf3a37fc81feddf15abbca20a2a6e09413bba88092e5f62f301bdc686
com.prayertimes.ramadan.qiblacompass 100,000+ dab26bda2df41694c8ed4dbbc9e1126a151192f22108a9dfaf2a7cbd2afa422c
com.studyapps.obshestvo 100,000+ 320e5c51d4ed75adda1caef64287c885f7eb6ef7aa81f88315f86d6074a34b54
com.studyapps.timetable 100,000+ 16d9c0e6705295dcfb7905ca419f37b62c2160deccc03b0725a54d79d2c57b80
com.riatech.crockpotrecipes 100,000+ 2bb0f074514eabd055052d4d8e758f7861823586c99ebef14594b1c60db4c7d7 50,000+ b9dfcbef9b08b22d48c9918593d55062a0bd208f0fcc917cce69ebb13186cb0b
com.tamilmusic.tamilradios.tamilfm 50,000+ bf8c06e8055be97cd306e1baa73723daa1efc918bd3eb7d4988cc9c6c2ba1283 10,000+ 6c0712bc308ccd7b2c70a03a5899e700eb757a01dcf3fa986354071dd27bd0ef
  • C&C Servers:
    • bearclod[.]com
    • bearclod[.]com

Appendix 3 – Joker IOC’s:

Package Name Installs Sha256 100,000+ 08f53bbb959132d4769c4cb7ea6023bae557dd841786643ae3d297e280c2ae08
com.race.mely.wpaper 10,000,+ 44102fc646501f1785dcadd591092a81365b86de5c83949c75c380ab8111e4e8 10,000,+ 9c713db272ee6cc507863ed73d8017d07bea5f1414d231cf0c9788e6ca4ff769
com.vailsmsplus 10,000+ 1194433043679ef2f324592220dcd6a146b28689c15582f2d3f5f38ce950d2a8


  • C&C Servers:
    • 3.123.204[.]12
  • Dropped payload:
    • 95aeeae8a422e917bc555a8a7a71f35648649d95bdf9c7b46669e8f1059b6cfa



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